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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
Department of Social Services, 
Plaint iff/Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID R. PETERS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20636 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
DAVID R. PETERS 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, Honorable Kenneth Rigtraup, 
District Court Judge 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
This case involved an adjudication of paternity by 
default judgment against David R. Peters, the aopellant 
herein, and hereafter referred to as "Peters". The case 
centers around the propriety of the District Court's denial 
of Peters1 Motion to Set Aside said default judqment approxi-
mately four months after it was entered and allow him an 
opportunity to contest the issue and have the matter adjudi-
cated on the merits. 
On July 5, 1984, plaintiff, State of Utah, by and 
through the Department of Social Services, hereinafter 
denoted as State, filed a complaint pursuant to Sections 
78-45a-2 and 78-45a-5(2), U.C.A. alleging paternity and 
support pursuant to 78-45a-l U.C.A. (R-2-5) Appended 
thereto was an affidavit of one Debra K. Smith (R-6 & 7) 
signed and sworn to on May 22, 1984, in which she averred 
Peters to be the father of an "unborn" child. On July 22, 
1984, Constable Scott Stowers submitted an "unable to 
locate" return after attempting to serve Peters at 1504 East 
1700 South in Salt Lake City (R-10) after having made five 
trips. On August 6, 1984, a return of service was filed 
indicating service of a summons and complaint upon one Adam 
Trujillo at the same address on September 6, 1984, and on 
the 4th day of October a default judgment was entered ad-
judicating inter alia Peters to be the father of one Echo 
D. Smith, born June 3, 1984. (R-14 & 15) 
On February 4, 1985, after receiving a notice from 
Recovery Service, Peters filed a Motion to Set Aside Judg-
ment together with an Affidavit. In Peters' Affidavit he 
swore he had newer been served with the summons and complaint, 
that at the time of the alleged service he was living in 
Vernal, Utah, that he had not authorized anyone to accept 
service in his behalf, and generally failed to recall having 
sex with a Debra Smith and denied paternity. (R-17 & 18) 
Peters1 Motion was duly noticed and heard on February 22nd. 
At the hearing counsel for the State informed the Court that 
2 
he could get some evidence showing that Peters was in fact 
residing at the address in question on the date of service. 
Pursuant thereto the Court continued the matter until March 
8th. 
On March 8th, counsel for the State submitted a 
statement from one Fred Roberts in which Mr. Roberts claimed 
Mr. Peters lived at the residence from June 6th through 
November 19th, and copies of some unemployment insurance 
checks made payable to Peters addressed to 1504 East 1700 
South. Counsel for Mr. Peters were newer given copies of 
either, nor provided any opportunity to refute or clarify 
the documents. 
Peters simply contends that he was living in Vernal 
at the time service was made and that he never received 
proper notice. After notification by Recovery Services he 
consulted with counsel and diligently proceeded. Peters 
denies paternity and simply requests he be allowed to answer 
and have the matter adjudicated. (R-18) No where has either 
the State or Debra Smith alleged any prejudice of their 
rights if Peters be allowed to resolve the issue of paternity, 
and Peters submits that the best interests of the minor child 
compel a satisfactory conclusion of this issue. Peters sub-
mits the parties are at least entitled to have the benefit of 
blood and tissue tests performed and considered which have 
not been done because of the Court's denial of his Motion. 
3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON PETERS WAS DEFECTIVE 
AND THEREFORE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT WAS DENIED 
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. 
The service of the Summons and Complaint was de-
fective pursuant to the appropriate Utah Rules of Procedu 
and the taking of a subsequent default judgment adjudicat 
the issue of paternity effectively denied him procedural 
due process of law. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 
THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT ADJUDICATING PATERNITY. 
Failure of the trial court to grant appellant's 
Motion to Set Aside a Default Judgment under the provisio 
of Rule 60(b) in a paternity case was an abuse of discret 
and constitutes reversible error when made 120 days after 
default was entered adjudicating appellant the father of 
contested issue in the absence of blood tests. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON PETERS WAS DEFECTIVE 
AND THEREFORE APPELLANT WAS DENIED PROCEDURAL 
DUE PROCESS. 
Appellant Peters contends that service of process 
of the summons and complaint was, under these particular 
circumstances, not sufficient as a matter of law, and tha 
said deficiency deprives him of procedural due process as 
4 
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U.R.C.P. to bastardy proceedings because of their statutory 
origin. However, nothing contained in Utah's Act on Paternity 
78-45a-et.seq, U.C.A., or its Public Support of Children Act, 
78-45b-et.seq. would appear to alter the requirements of Rule 
4, U.R.C.P. or procedural due process mandates. 
pule 4(e), U.R.C.P. provides for personal service in 
this state and reads in relevant part: 
(1) Upon a natural person of the age of 14 
years or over, by delivering a copy thereof to 
him personally, or by leaving such copy at his 
usual place of abode with some person of suit-
able age and discretion there residing; or by 
delivering a copy to an agent authorized by 
appointment or by law to receive service of process. 
The pleadings in this case establish that nothing 
was personally served upon the person of Peters even though 
it appears seven attempts were made at a residence located 
at 1504 East 1700 South in Salt Lake City (R-10 & 12). In 
fact, the return of service filed in this matter indicates 
service upon one "Adam Trujillo, roommate," on September 6, 
1984, (R-12), by one Pledger Cartwright, a deputy. Rule 
4(g), U.R.C.P. states: 
Manner of Proof. Within five (5) days after 
service of process, proof thereof shall be 
made as follows: 
(1) If served by a sheriff, or United States 
Marshall, or a deputy of either, by his certificate 
with a statement as to the date, place, and manner 
of service. 
(2) If by any other person, by his affidavit 
thereof, with the same statement. 
The summons filed in this matter shows that it was 
filed on September 13, 1984, (R-ll) which was not within 
the five day requirement specified above. This Court has 
6 
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constitutes an abuse of discretion because said judgment 
was void, Brimholt v. Mecham, 27 Utah 2d 222, 494 P.2d 525 
(1972); Woody v. Rhodes, 23 Utah 2d 249,461 P.2d 465 (1969) 
and lack of due process entitled Peters to relief, B i s h' s 
Sheet Metal Company v. Lucas, 11 Utah 2d 357, 359 P.2d 21 
(1961). 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 
THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT ADJUDICATING PATERNITY. 
Appellant concedes that the trial court is vested 
with considerable discretion in determining whether or not 
to grant a motion to set aside a default judgment under the 
provisions of Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., Pacer Sport & Cycle, 
Inco v. Myers, 534 P.2d 616 (Utah 1975), and that its ruling 
will not be set aside absent an abuse of discretion, Pi tman 
v. Bonham, 677 P.2d 1126 (Utah 1984). However, Peters 
submits that where there exists doubt about whether a default 
should be set aside, the doubt should be resolved in favor 
of doing so, at least to the extent that each party may receive 
an opportunity to present his side of the controversy and 
receive a judicial resolution, Interstate Excavating v. Ada, 
Dev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980). 
Appellant submits that the Utah Courts should exercise 
greater latitude in setting aside default judgments in view 
of the restrictive 90 day rule contained in 60(b), U„R.C.P. 
being mindful of the one year time limit imposed by Rule 60(b) 
F.R.C.P., see Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Vaughn, 450 F.2d 257, 
8 
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DATED t h i s a i • J < < , " * t fb. 
BENJAMIN P . K N W m i r 
A110 r n e c ~ ,,, A , n e 11 a n t 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that 4 true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Defendant/Appellant David R. Peters 
were served upon counsel for Plaintiff/Respondent by de-
livering said copies to the office of the Attorney General, 
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this ^pgypday 
of August, 1985. 
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TED ^ANNUN 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: Randall L. Skeen 
Deputy County Attomev 
319 5 South Mair 
Salt Lake City, Utan • ..,5 
FILED r, U£RKSOPF„-yt. 
-a'? LakeCountvl::arr 
HDixo^Hlndtey. Clerfc3r*D.s. cour 
'^t- i*ly ,CiHrK 
IN 7i:r DISTRICT CtoPT .,K THE MilRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
:: /,.<. . i j- SAL'! lAKr COUNTY, STAM- OF ~ Ah 
STATE OF UTAH by and tnrougn 
Department of Social Services 
^ 7 S 
DAVID R. PETERS 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. C 84 3995 
The * -^reqoing mattoi came or regularly for hearira of 
Detenaa;:: ~s-.\ i- Juilnrrw--' .- * • •- ;-: - - ^ay March, 
1985 at the hour oi - : = : before the iionorai.ie ^^ :^ .•(-• i - v up. "f 
St.^ " "f "i--v *• represented by counsel, Jeffrey •', Thorpe for 
Rancia , ..J*J* ; uei i-ru l<i i. I I1,, . " i n-lcrs was represented by 
coun s e1, Ben P , Know] ton. 
Based uoor h he r ] ead -»" nn s on f 11«- Herein, and upon the Court 
having !:'.:•..-.• , . . . r •-* • »?-•• respective counsel, it Is 
hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that: 
Dtlei^.i./ „ * J ^ereby denied. 
DATED t h J s ' ;; day < • 1 Ma r ch , 3 ^  H '-J , 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
Department of Social Services, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs 
DAVID R. PETERS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20636 
ADDENDUM TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, Honorable Kenneth Rigtraup, 
District Court Judge 
Benjamin P. Knowlton 
243 East 400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone:531-0523 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
David Wilkinson 
Room 236 
State Capitol Buildinq 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for PIaintiff/Respondent 
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Rule 3(a) RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
case was one for court of equity rather 
than a court of law, but question as to 
nature of action was not jurisdictional, as 
both law and equity could be administered 
in same action. Norback v. Board of Di-
rectors of Church Extension Soc , 84 U. 
506, 37 P. 2d 339. 
Equitable defenses. 
Equitable defenses were authorized 
against legal claims. Columbia Trust Co. 
v. Anglum, 63 U. 353, 225 P . 1089. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Rule 3(a) was amended by the Supreme 
Court on March 27, 1964, effective June 
1, 1964. The amendment inserted provi-
sions for personal service, mailing or de-
posit of a copy of the complaint; and 
substituted "change the requirement of 
section 12-1-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953" 
for "abrogate the requirements of chapter 
28, Laws of Utah 1945" at the end of the 
section. 
The first sentence of this Rule is similar 
to Fed. Rule 3. 
Cross-References. 
Change, adjournment or failure of term, 
action not abated, 78-7-10. 
Filing with the court defined, Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 5(e) . 
Pleadings allowed, Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, Rule 7. 
Register of actions, Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, Rule 79(a) . 
Torms of action. 
The abolition of forms of action and 
pleadings did not cure an answer so de-
fective that plaintiff could not traverse 
it. Buskin v. Godbe, 1 U. 28. 
The common-law names applied to the 
various actions or remedies no longer had 
any practical force or effect, except when 
the court was called upon to give effect to 
a particular s tatute. O'Neill v. San Pedro, 
L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 38 U. 475, 114 P. 127. 
Constitutionality. 
The fact that this rule provides alterna-
tive means to institute a suit does not 
mean that it creates a discriminatory in-
equality depriving lit igants of the equal 
protection of the law.s; therefore, it is 
constitutional. Genuine Par ts Co. v. Lar-
son, 555 P. 2d 285. 
Amended complaint. 
Filing of complete amended complaint, 
with no reference to former complaint and 
no documents incorporated by reference, 
supersedes former complaint. Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, 
Local Union 222 v. Motor Cargo, 530 P . 
2d 807. 
Bastardy proceeding. 
Summons under this Rule is not required 
for bastardy proceeding in which defend-
ant has been served by warrant under 77-
60-1. State v. Judd, 27 U. (2d) 79, 493 
P. 2d 604. 
PART II 
Commencement of Action; Service of Process, 
Pleadings, Motions and Orders 
RULE 3 
COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION 
(a) How Commenced. A civil action is commenced (1) by filing a com-
plaint with the court, or (2) by the service of a summons. If the action is 
commenced by the service of a summons, the complaint, together with the 
summons and proof of service thereof, must be filed within ten days after 
such service and a copy of the complaint shall be served upon or mailed to 
the defendant if his address is known; if unknown, a copy must be deposited 
with the clerk for him, or the action thus commenced shall be deemed dis-
missed and the court shall have no further jurisdiction thereof; provided, 
however, that the foregoing provision shall not change the requirement of 
section 12-1-8, Utah Code Annotated 1053. 
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CoUateral References. 
Process<3=>4 to 6. 
72 C.J.S. Process § 2. 
62 Am. Jur . 2d 788, Process § 5. 
Conclusive election of remedies as pred-
icated on commencement of action, or its 
Necessity for issuance of summons. 
Where complaint was filed November 13, 
1888 and amended January 16, 1889, but 
no summons was ever issued, defendant's 
voluntary answer without objection was 
waiver of right to summons and action 
commenced on date of original complaint. 
Needham v. Salt Lake City, 7 U. 319, 26 
P. 920, applying 2 Comp. Laws 1888, 
§ 3155. But see Farmers ' Banking Co. v. 
Bullon, 62 U. 1, 217 P . 969, applying Comp. 
Laws 1917, § 6539. 
Oral statement of complaint. 
To invoke original jurisdiction of dis-
trict court, complaint, petition or applica-
tion was required; oral statement of com-
plaint was insufficient. State v. Telford, 
93 U. 228, 72 P. 2d 626. 
Recitals in summons. 
Where summons stated neither that 
Compliance with statute. 
Where complaint, summons and proof of 
service were filed within statutory period 
but return of service showed untimely fil-
ing of complaint, and because of mistake 
of stenographer, copy of complaint had 
not been deposited with clerk, court should 
have allowed plaintiff to deposit copy of 
complaint to amend return of service. 
West Mountain Lime & Stone Co. v. Dan-
ley, 38 U. 218, 111 P. 647. 
prosecution short of judgment on the 
merits, 6 A. L. R. 2d 10. 
Tolling of statute of limitations where 
process is not served before expiration of 
limitation period, as affected by statutes 
defining commencement of action, or ex-
pressly relating to interruption of running 
of limitations, 27 A. L. R. 2d 236. 
complaint had been filed nor that it would 
be filed within ten days after service, it 
was fatally defective, and defendant had 
remedy in Supreme Court by certiorari. 
Wasatch Livestock Loan Co. v. District 
Court in and for Uintah County, 86 U. 
422, 46 P. 2d 399. 
Statute of limitations. 
Where complaint was filed within period 
of limitations, action was not barred, not-
withstanding summons was not served 
until after such period. Keyser v. Pollock, 
20 U. 371, 59 P. 87. 
Where complaint was filed and no sum-
mons was issued, amended complaint filed 
seven years thereafter was not barred by 
statute of limitations, since original com-
plaint commenced action, which was still 
pending. Askwith v. Ellis, 85 U. 103, 38 
P. 2d 757. 
Where action was commenced by serv-
ing summons, the complaint, summons and 
proof of service were required to be filed 
within statutory period; otherwise, action 
could not be commenced. James v. Jensen, 
50 U. 485, 167 P. 827, applying Comp. 
Laws 1907, § 2946. 
Extension of time to file. 
Extension of time for filing pleadings 
was a matter within discretion of the 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
(b) Filing Copy of Complaint. When the complaint is filed, a copy 
thereof shall be deposited with the court for the benefit of the defendants 
not otherwise served with such copy at the time of the service of the 
summons. Any defendant, not served with a copy of the complaint, and 
for whom no copy thereof is available with the court, may serve a 
written demand upon the plaintiff for a copy of such complaint, and 
thereafter the time in which such defendant shall be required to plead 
to the complaint shall commence to run from the date a copy thereof is 
served upon such defendant. 
Cross-Reference CoUateral References. 
Filing with the court defined, Rules of Pleading<§=>331. 
Civil Procedure, Rule 5(c) . 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 408 to 412. 
(51 Am. Jur . 2d 749, Pleading §§348 to 
350. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
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Rule 4(e) RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Where defendant "may be found." 
Where defendant was served in transi-
tory tort action in county of residence, 
court acquired jurisdiction of action de-
spite fact that acts complained of occurred 
in different county. Sanipoli v. Pleasant 
Valley Coal Co., 31 U. 114, 80 P. 865, 10 
Ann/Cas. 1142, applying R. S. 1898, § 2940. 
Where obligors on bond xvero sued in 
county other than county of their resi-
dence and were personally served, court 
had jurisdiction over them; the court re-
jected contention that defendants not hav-
ing contracted to perform their obligation 
at any particular place, the cause of ac-
tion must be deemed to have arisen where 
thev reside. Continental Life Ins. & Inv. 
Co." v. Jones, 31 U. 403, 88 P. 229. 
Personal service within the state (e) Personal Service in this State, 
shall be as follows : 
(1) Upon a natural person of the age of 14 years or over, by delivering 
a copy thereof to him personally, or by leaving such copy at his usual 
place __oL abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there 
residing; or by delivering a copy to an agent authorized by appointment 
or by law to receive service of process. 
Compiler's Notes. Secretary of state as agent. 
Nonresident motorists were not "absent 
from the s ta te" so as to toll the statute 
of limitations although they left the state 
immediately after collision and remained 
without state, because process could have 
been served upon secretarv of state. 
Snyder v. Chine, 15 U. (2d)* 254, 390 P. 
2d 015. 
Collateral References. 
Process<3=>57, 58. 
72 C.J.S. Process §§ 26 to 42. 
62 Am. Jur. 2d 828, Process § 47. 
Armed forces: service of process on 
person in military service by serving per-
son at civilian abode or residence, or leav-
ing copy there, 46 A. L. K. 2d 1239. 
Construction of phrase "usual place of 
abode," or similar terms referring to 
abode, residence, or domicil, as used in 
statutes relating to service of process, 32 
A. L. R. 3d 112. 
Doing business: what amounts to doing 
business in a state within statute provid-
ing for service of process in action against 
nonresident natural person or persons do-
ing business in state, 10 A. L. R. 2d 200. 
Fraud or trickery, a t tack on personal 
service as having been obtained by, 98 
A. L. R. 2d 551. 
Necessity, in service by leaving process 
at place of abode, etc., of leaving a copy 
of summons for each party sought to be 
served, 8 A. L. R. 2d 343. 
Place or manner of delivering or de-
positing papers^ under statutes permitt ing 
service of process by leaving copy at usual 
place of abode or residence, 87 A. L. R. 2d 
1163. 
(2) Upon a natural person under the age of 14 years, by delivering 
a copy thereof to such person and also to his father, mother or guardian; 
or, if none can be found within the state, then to any person having the 
This section is modeled after Fed. Rule 
• K d H i ) . " 
Cross-References. 
Condominium ownership, service of proc-
ess on person designated in declaration, 
57-8-33. 
Failure to serve summons upon defend-
ant, motion for relief, Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, Rule 60(b). 
Highways, service of process on non-
resident motorist using, 41-12-8. 
Insurance agent or broker, agent for 
service of process on nonresident, 31-17-35. 
News gathering, service of process on 
person in business of, 50-2-7. 
Nonresidents, acts submitting person to 
jurisdiction of state courts, 78-27-22 to 78-
27-24. 
Part ies not originally served, proceed-
ings after judgment, Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, Rule 71B(b). 
Prisoners, service of process on, 17-22-6. 
Real estate broker, agent for service of 
process on nonresident, 61-2-6. 
Real estate brokers and salesmen, no-
tice of hearing on lieense, 61-2-12. 
Sheriff, service of process on as party, 
17-22-25. 
Enticement into state. 
Party invited into state by plaintiff to 
discuss disputed matter was not subject 
to service of process for reasonable time 
eovering negotiation period and his com-
ing to and returning from meeting. West-
ern States Refining Co. v. Berry, 6 U. (2d) 
336, 313 P. 2d 480. 
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cure and control of such minor, or 
service lie is employed. 
Compiler's Notes. 
There is no similar Fed. Rule. 
Cross-References. 
Failure to serve summons upon defend-
ant, motion for relief, Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, Kule 00(b). 
Juvenile Court Act, service of summons 
iintl process, 78-3;i-27. 
Collateral References. 
ProcessC^oG to 58. 
72 C.J.S. Process §31 . 
02 Am. Jur . 2d 914, Process § 131. 
with whom he resides, or in whose 
Construction and effect of provision for 
service of process against minor on a 
parent, guardian, or other designated per-
son, 92 A. L. R. 2d 1336. 
Juvenile delinquency and dependency-
proceedings, necessity of service of process 
upon infant itself, 90 A. L. R. 2d 293. 
Nonresident guardian: propriety of serv-
ice of process in an in personam action 
on resident minor defendant whose only 
guardian is a nonresident and cannot be 
served validly either within or without 
state, 86 A. L. R. 2d 1183. 
(3) Upon a natural person judicially declared to be of unsound mind 
or incapable of conducting his own affairs, by delivering a copy thereof 
to his legal guardian. 
Collateral References.
 72 c j s p r o c e s s § 31. 
Process<3=350 to 58. 62 Am. Jur . 2d 914, Process § 131. 
(4) Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise provided for, upon 
a partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to 
suit under a common name, by delivering a copy thereof to an officer, 
a managing or general agent, or to any other agen t^au lhor ized jy 
appointnienl_QjL.,by_.la.\r__to receive sen^clTjof process and, if the agent is~T 
one authorized by statute to receive service and the statute so requires,/ 
by also mailing a copy to the defendant. If no such officer or agent canT" 
he found in the county in which the action is brought, then upon any^ 
such officer or agent, or any clerk, cashier, managing agent, chief clerk,) 
or other agent having the management, direction or control of any 
property of such corporation, partnership or other unincorporated~associa-" 
£ioiT~wit]iin the_state. If no such officer or agent can be found in the 
state, and the defendant has, or advertises or holds itself out as having, 
an office or place of business in this state, or does business in this state, 
then upon the person doing such business or in charge of such office^ 
place of business. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The first sentence of this Rule is sub-
stantially similar to Fed. Rule 4(d)(3) ' . 
The rest of the text has no counterpart 
in the Fed. Rules. 
Cross-References. 
Bedding and upholstered furniture com 
panics, service of process on, •I-28-38 to service 
4-28-40. 
Condominium association, service of 
process on person designated in declara-
tion, 57-8-33. 
Corporation, agent for service of proc-
ess, ('oust. Art. XTT, $i>: 10-10-11, 10-10-13. 
Debt management business, service of 
process on, 58-30-4. 
Foreign corporation, agent for service of 
process on, 16-10-111, 16-10-125. 
Foreign industrial loan corporation, 
agent for service of process on, 7-8-8. 
Foreign insurer, attorney for service of 
process on, 31-5-16, 31-5-17, 31-26-1. 
Foreign savings and loan association, 
agent for service of process on, 7-13-60. 
Fraternal benefit society, service of 
process on, 31-29-19, 31-29-37. 
Insurance holding company, service of 
process on, 31-39-2(9). 
News-gathering business, service of 
process on, 50-2-7. 
Nonprofit foreign corporation, agent for 
service of process on, 16-6-88, 16-6-101. 
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Time intervening bet WITH filing of ;in*i-
davit and order for publication of sum-
mons bad to be reasonable, otherwise affi-
davit no longer constitutes prima facie 
evidence of defendant's residence; one 
month between nilidnvit and order was 
unreasonable. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 43 IT. 
M, 134 P. f>95, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 499. 
Where in action to quiet title to various 
pieces of land various parties are made 
defendants, all not being interested in 
same parcel, insufficiency of affidavit upon 
which order of publication was based does 
not render judgment void as to resident 
defendant personally served. Salt Lake 
Citv v. Salt Lake Inv. Co., 43 U. 181, 134 
P. 603. 
Predecessor section referred to proce-
dure necessary to acquire jurisdiction; affi-
davit and order of court required for serv-
ice by publication were not required for 
personal service on nonresidents. Ricks v. 
Wade, 97 IT. 402, 93 P. 2d 479, decided 
Collateral attack. 
Affidavit and order for publication of 
summons, not being part of judgment roll 
and of record, would not, on collateral 
attack, be inquired into. Liebhardt v. 
Lawrence, 40 U. 243, 120 P. 215. 
Compliance with statute. 
Noncompliance with section nullified 
judgment by default which would be set 
aside at subsequent term on motion. Park 
v. Iligbee, 6 IT. 414, 24 P. 524. 
Provisions were required to be followed 
with at least reasonable strictness. Atkin-
son v. Atkinson, 43 U. 53, 134 P. 505, 47 
L. R. A. (N. S.) 499. 
Direct attack. 
Action in nature of suit in equity could 
be maintained to set aside default judg-
ment quieting title obtained by defendant 
on service by publication, on ground of 
false averment in affidavit for publication 
that plaintiff's place of residence was 
unknown. Liebhardt v. Lawrence, 40 U. 
243, 120 P. 215. 
Divorce. 
Section authorized service by publica 
tion of copy of complaint and summons 
upon nonresident defendant in action for 
divorce on ground of permanent insanity. 
Schafer v. Ritchie, 49 U. I l l , 162 P. 618. 
Neither service by publication nor per-
sonal service out of state authorized court 
to enter personal judgment, but where de-
fendant in divorce action converted spe-
cial appearance into general appearance 
by appearing and moving to dismiss ac-
tion, court acquired personal jurisdiction. 
Ricks v. Wade, 97 U. 402, 93 P. 2d 479. 
Mortgage foreclosures. 
Action to foreclose mortgage was in rem 
and could be prosecuted upon constructive 
service in so far as property only was 
reached, but no personal judgment could 
be obtained against mortgagor for any 
deficiency after sale, unless personal serv-
ice was obtained within state. Boueofski 
v. Jacobsen, 36 IT. 165, 104 P. 117, 26 L. 
R. A. (N. S.) 898. 
Waiver. 
Neither service by publication nor per-
sonal service out of state authorized court 
to enter personal judgment, but where de-
fendant in divorce action converted spe-
cial appearance into general appearance 
by appearing and moving to dismiss ac-
tion, court acquired personal jurisdiction. 
Ricks v. Wade, 97 U. 402, 93 P . 2d 479. 
(g) Manner of Proof. Within f> days after service of process, proof 
thereof shall be made as follows": 
(1) If served by a sheriff or United Slates marshal, or a deputy of 
either, by his certificate with a statement as to the date, place, and manner 
of service. 
(2) If by any other person, by his affidavit thereof, with the same 
statement. 
(3) If by publication by the affidavit of the publisher or printer or 
his foreman or principal clerk, showing- the same and specifying the date 
of the first and last publications; and an affidavit by the clerk of the 
court of a deposit of a copy of the summons and complaint in the post 
office as prescribed by subdivision (f) of this rule, if such deposit shall 
have been made. 
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(4) By the written admission or 
be served, duly acknowledged, or other 
Compiler's Notes. 
This Rule differs substantially from Fed. 
Rule 4(g) . 
Cross-References. 
Register of actions, Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, Rule 79(a). 
Return of process bv sheriff, 17-22-11 to 
17-22-13. 
Tardy proof of service. 
Proof of personal service on nonresident 
made eight days after service was not 
jurisdictional defect that would destroy 
validity of service. Redwood Land Co. v. 
Kimball, 20 U. (2d) 113, 433 P. 2d 1010. 
Written admission or waiver of service. 
Under subd. (4) any proof of written 
admission or waiver of service is sufficient 
if so regarded by court; statement signed 
by defendant in presence of the plaintiff's 
attorney who represented to court that 
such was defendant's signature was suffi-
cient. Locke v. Peterson, 3 U. (2d) 415, 
285 P. 2d 1111. 
Collateral References. 
ProcessC^l27 to 150. 
72 C..T.S. Process §§ 90 to 105. 
02 Am. Jur . 2d 946, Process §§ 104 to 
182. 
waiver of service by the person to 
wise proved. 
Affidavit of substantial defense to merits 
in an attachment or garnishment proceed-
ing as general appearance, 11G A. L. R. 
1215. 
Appearance to make application for ex-
tension of time or continuance, or order 
in that regard, as waiver of objection to 
jurisdiction for lack of personal service, 
81 A. L. R. 100. 
Attack by defendant upon attachment 
or garnishment as an appearance subject-
ing him personally to jurisdiction, 129 
A. L. R. 1240. 
Civil liability of one making false or 
fraudulent return of process, 31 A. L. R. 
3d 1393. 
Failure to make return as affecting 
validity of service or court's jurisdiction, 
82 A. L. R. 2d 608. 
Filing cross-petition or other step 
amounting to general appearance after 
judgment based upon valid constructive 
service as affecting right under statute to 
open judgment, 122 A. L. R, 159. 
Power of infant to acknowledge service 
of process or to bind himself by waiver or 
estoppel in that regard, 121 A. L. R. 957. 
Relief as to costs or disbursements as 
changing special appearance to general 
appearance, 102 A. L. R. 224. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Acquisition of jurisdiction. 
Court with jurisdiction of subject mat-
ter acquired jurisdiction of defendant, 
cither by his voluntary appearance or by 
process served upon him. Continental Life 
Ins. & Inv. Co. v. Jones, 31 U. 403, 88 P. 
229. 
General appearance. 
General appearance of defendant by de-
murrer and answer waived all objections 
to summons, and court with jurisdiction 
of subject matter acquired jurisdiction of 
defendant. Keyser v. Pollock, 20 U. 371, 
59 P. 87; McMillan v. Forsythe, 47 U. 571, 
154 P. 959; Jensen v. Hinckley, 55 U. 
300, 311, 185 P. 716; Clawson v. Boston 
Acme Mines Dev. Co., 72 U. 137, 209 P . 
147, 59 A. L. R, 1318. 
Proof of service. 
Tf affidavit filed in proof of service did 
not show compliance with provisions of 
statute, judgment by default entered 
thereon would be set aside. Columbia 
Trust Co. v. Steiner, 71 U. 498, 267 P. 788. 
Scope and operation of section. 
Term "defendant" used in predecessor 
section referred exclusively to party to 
proceeding. Board of Education of Nebo 
School Dist. v. Jeppson, 74 U. 576, 280 P. 
1005. 
Service of summons. 
Service of summons was necessary only 
when defendant and his rights and prop-
erty were being brought juridically before 
court against his will. Askwith v. Ellis, 
S5 U. 103, 38 P. 2d 757. 
(h) Amendment. At any time in its discretion and upon such terms 
as it deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service 
thereof to be amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice 
would result to the substantial rights of the party against whom the 
process issued. 
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DECISIONS FNDKK FORMER LAW 
Inherent power of courts. errors. Frost v. District Court of First 
The courts of this state had recognized Judicial Dist. in and for Box Elder 
the inherent right of a court to enter a County, 96 U. 106, 83 P. 2d 737, on re-
judgment nunc pro tunc to correct clerical hearing 96 TT. 115, 85 P. 2d 601. 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered 
Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the fol-
lowing reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b) ; 
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), mis-
representation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for 
any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally served upon 
the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed 
to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgmeiit, 
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon 
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; 
or (7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for"" 
reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than three months.after the judg-
ment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. ^This Rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain 
an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the cour t ] The pro-
cedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these Rules or by an independent action. 
Compiler's Notes. An oral promise made by the attorney 
This Rule is patterned after, and si mi- f o r the plaintiff to the effect that defend-
e r to, Fed. Rule 00(b), but incorporates mit ™uld have more time in which to im-
material not found in the Fed. Rule and «w«r, where the plaintiff already had ob-
deviates textuallv from it. lam d a default judgment, was not suffi-
cient excusable neglect so as to allow the 
Notice to parties. vacation of the default judgment. The 
Motion to reconsider a motion is not defendants were deprived of nothing by 
provided for under these Rules, but even the alleged promise inasmuch as the de-
if it were, trial court erred in hearing fault judgment had already been entered, 
defendant's motion and acting upon it ex s , , ( ' h Jl promise could in no way bind a 
parte and without any notice to plaintiff. <' l i ent " ' ho already had a judgment. War- / 
Ftah State Employees Credit Union v. ,,(,» v- Dixon Ranch Co., 123 U. 416, 2G0 P. / 
Riding, 24 U. (2d) 211, 4f)0 P. 2d I. -<l 7 4 l« 
Illness alone is not sufficient to make 
Subdivision (1). neglect in defending one's action excus-
The fact that his counsel did not re- J»ble. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 U. 
ceive notice and findings from the clerk 41(1, 200 P. 2d 741. - j 
of the court does not entitle an appellant T l j e allowance of a vacation of a judg- i 
to file out of time a motion to amend find- m e , , t i s a creature of equity designed to I 
hvrs and decree, and a motion for a new relieve against harshness of enforcing a; 
trial. In re Bandy's Estate, 121 U. 21H), 241 judgment, which may occur through pro-. 
P. 2d 402. cedural difficulties, the wrongs of the op-
posing party, or misfortunes which pre-
277 
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(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Dis-
covered Evidence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms 
as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal represent-
ative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the follow-
ing reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence 
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b) ; (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of 
an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment 
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment 
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, 
or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have pro-
spective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not 
more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding 
was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does 
not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. 
This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an in-
dependent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or 
proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually person-
ally notified as provided in Title 28, U.S.C., S 1655, or to set 
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram no-
bis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in 
the nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure 
for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
As amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff. March 19, 1948; Dec. 29, 1948, 
eff. Oct. 20,1949. 
Rule 61. 
HARMLESS ERROR 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence 
and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything 
done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground 
for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for va-
cating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, 
unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsist-
ent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding 
which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
86 
AMENDMENTS 
TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition tlie government for a redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT III 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without 
the consent of the Owner, nor in lime of war, but in a manner to be 
prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor sluill private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
18 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AMEND. XIV, § 5 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States accord-
ing to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. I>ut when the right to vote 
at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President 
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and 
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is 
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years 
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except 
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation 
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male 
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years 
of age in such State. 
Section 3. 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector 
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under 
the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken 
an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, 
or as a member of any State legislature or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given 
aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. P>ut Congress may by a vote of two-
thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by 
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for 
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. 
But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt 
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the 
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article. 
21 
ART. I, § 7 CONSTITUTK 
Gun control laws, validity and construe 
tion of, 28 A. L. U. 3d 817). 
Law Reviews. 
The Constitutional Right to Keep and 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be clop rived of ] 
process of law. 
Comparable Provision. 
Montana Const., Art. IIT, §27. 
Cross-Kef erence. 
Eminent domain gonoialK, 78-.°. I-1 et 
seq. 
In general. 
"Due process of law" comes to us from 
the Great Charter and is synonymous with 
"law of the land." I t means that a party 
shall have his day in court—trial. Jensen 
v. Union Pac. Py. Co., 0 U. 25:5, 21 P. 994, 
4 L. H. A. 724. 
Due process of law is not necessarily 
judicial process. People v. Hasbrouck, IL 
V. 291, 39 P. 918. 
Judgment against defendant, not served 
i with process and not appearing either in 
/ person or by attorney, would not be due 
! process of law. Blytli & Fargo Co. v. 
Swenson, 15 U. 345,*49 P. 1027. 
I t is elementary that there can be no 
judicial action affecting vested rights that 
is- not based upon some process or notice 
whereby the interested parties are brought 
within the jurisdiction of the judicial 
tribunal about to render judgment. Parry 
v. lionne\ille Irr . Dist., 71 U. 202, 2G3 P. 
751. 
. "Due process of law" requires that , be-
* fore one can be bound by a judgment 
/ affecting his property rights, some process 
/ must be served upon him which in some 
degree at least is calculated to give him 
' notice. Naisbit t v. Derrick, 70 U. 575, 
290 P. 950. 
Due process of law requires that notice 
/ be given to the poisons whose rights are 
' to be affected. I t hears before it con-
demns, pioceeds upon inquiry, and renders 
judgment only after trial. Kiggins v. Dis-
trict Court of Salt Lake County, 89 U. 
183, 51 P. 2d 645. 
The phrase "due process of law" appar-
4
 ently originated with Lord Coke, who de-
fined the terms. Many attempts have been 
made to further define due process of law, 
but all of them resolve into the thought 
that a party shall have his day in court. 
Christiansen v. Harris , 109 I J." 1, 103 P . 
2d 314. 
Tn depriving a person of life or lib-
erty, the essentials of due process are: 
(a) the existence of a competent person, 
I OF UTAH 
Pear Arms, Lucilius A. Kmeiy, 28 ITarv. 
L. Rev. 473. 
Restrictions on the Right To Pear Anns 
- State and Federal Firearms Legislation, 
98 U. Pa. L. Ptcv. 905. 
ife, liberty or property, without due 
body, or agency authoii /ed by law to de-
termine the questions; (b) an inquiry 
into the merits of the question by such 
person, body or agency; (c) notice to the 
person of the inauguration and purpose 
of the inquiry and the time at which 
such person should appear if he wishes 
to be heard; (d) right to appear in per-
son or by counsel; (c) fair opportunity 
to submit evidence, examine and cross-
examine witnesses; (f) judgment to be 
rendered upon the record thus made. In 
the absence of statute laying down other 
or more specific requirements, the above 
conditions meet the demands of due 
process. In the absence of specific pro-
visions to the contrary, due process does 
not require that an) or all of those 
requirements must be in writ ing or in 
any particular foim. In the interests of 
orderly procedure and certainty as to its 
proceedings and action taken, .any legally 
constituted body or agency should as l':\v 
as practical have written records of ail 
proceedings before it, except where other-
wise provided bv law. Christiansen v. 
Harris, 109 U. 1, 103 P. 2d 314. 
In the trial of criminal cases the stat-
utes prescribe certain rules of procedure, 
which must be substantially complied with 
to keep the proceedings within the duo 
processes of the law. A somewhat dif-
ferent set of rules is prescribed in ei\ il 
cases and in special proceedings. Some 
rules, .affecting all t} pes, are not found in 
the statutes, but in that great basic body 
of the law commonly known as the deci-
sions or rules of the courts. But all these 
methods and means provided for the pro-
tection and enforcement of human rights 
have the same basic requirements—that 
no party can be affected by such action, 
until his legal rights have been the sub-
ject of an inquiry by a person or body 
authorized by law to determine such 
rights, of which inquiry the party has due 
notice, and at which he had an opportu-
nity to be heard and to give evidence as 
to his rights or defenses. Christiansen v. 
Harris, 1U9 U. 1, 103 P. 2d 314. 
While normally we think of "due proc-
ess of law" as requiring judicial action, 
yet "due process" is not necessarily judi-
cial action. Christiansen v. Harris, 109 
U. 1, 103 P. 2d 314. 
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78-25-18 JUDICIAL CODE 
Mutilations, alterations, and deletions Presumptions and burden of proof as to 
as affecting admissibility in evidence of time of alteration of deed, 30 A. L. K. 
public record, 28 A. L. B. 2d 1443. 3d 571. 
78-25-18. Blood tests for child and alleged parents in civil actions and 
bastardy proceedings in which parentage is a relevant fact.—In any civil 
action or in bastardy proceedings in which the parentage of a person is a 
relevant fact, the court shall order the child and alleged parents to submit 
to blood tests. 
History: L. 1955, ch. 46, § 1. Cross-References. 
Title of Act Bastardy proceedings, 77-60-1 et seq. 
Uniform Act on Paterni ty, blood tests, 
An act providing for use of blood tests 78-45a-7 to 78-45a-10. 
to determine parentage, appointment of 
examiners by court, finding of exclusion 
of parentage conclusive, and costs to be 
determined by the court.—L. 1955, cb. 46. 
78-25-19. Blood test—Who to make.—The test may be made by no more 
than three qualified examiners of blood types, not restricted to physicians, 
who shall be appointed by the court. The examiner may not be informed 
of the identity of any party to the action in which he is appointed. 
History: L. 1955, ch. 46, § 2. 
78-25-20. Examiner as witness.—The court shall call the examiner as a 
witness to testify to his findings, and the examiner is subject to cross-
examination by the parties, except that the order for blood tests may direct 
that the testimony of the examiner and cross-examination be taken by depo-
sition as provided by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
History: L. 1955, ch. 46, § 3. 
78-25-21. Admissibility of results in evidence.—The results of the 
tests shall be received in evidence where the conclusion of all examiners, 
as disclosed by the tests, is that the alleged father is not the actual father 
of the child, and the question of paternity shall be so resolved. If the 
examiners disagree in their findings or conclusions, the question shall be 
submitted to a jury duly impaneled. If the examiners conclude that the 
blood tests show the possibility of the alleged father's paternity, admission 
of this evidence is within the discretion of the court, depending upon the 
infrequency of the blood type. 
History: L. 1955, ch. 46, § 4; 1969, ch. parentage must be taken as conclusively 
257, § 1. proved and shall be the basis for a di-
rected verdict. A finding of exclusion of 
Compiler's Notes. parentage shall overcome the presumption 
The 1969 amendment rewrote this sec- of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock." 
tion which read: "The results of the tests 
shall be received in evidence where definite CoUateral References. 
exclusion of parentage is established, Bastards<S=>65. 
otherwise the results of the tests shall be 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 93. 
inadmissible. When the results of the tests 10 Am. Jur . 2d 928, Bastards § 118. 
are received in evidence, the exclusion of 
78-25-22. Court may resolve parentage against party refusing to submit 
to blood tests.—The court may resolve the question of parentage against 
330 
78-45a-4 JUDICIAL CODE 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 3. 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 53. 
10 Am. Jur . 2d 936, Bastards 8 127. 
Collateral References. 
BastardsC=>34. 
78-45a-4. Limitations on recovery from father's estate.—The obligation 
of the estate of the father for liabilities under this act are limited to 
amounts accrued prior to his death and such sums as may be payable for 
dependency under other laws. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 4. 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 53. 
, _ „ 10 Am. Jur . 2d 936. Bastards § 127. 
Collateral References. 
BastaidsC=>34. 
78-45a-5. Remedies.— (1) The district court has jurisdiction of an 
action under this act and all remedies for the enforcement of judgments 
for expenses of pregnancy and confinement for a wife or for education, 
necessary support, or funeral expenses for legitimate children apply. The 
court has continuing jurisdiction to modify or revoke a judgment for 
future education and necessary support. All remedies under the Uniform 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, are available for enforcement of 
duties of support under this act. 
(2) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor 
and the state department of social services may proceed on behalf of the 
obligee or in its own behalf pursuant to the provisions of chapter 45b of 
this title to enforce that right of support against the obligor. In such 
actions by the department, all the provisions of chapter 45b of this title 
shall be equally applicable to this chapter. Whenever a court action is 
commenced by the state department of social services, it shall be the duty 
of the attorney general or the county attorney, of the county of residence 
of the obligee, to represent that department. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 5 ; 1975, ch. Cross-Reference. 
96, §24. Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
^ ., , >T * - Support Act, 77-Gla-l et sen. 
Compiler's Notes. H ' * 
The 1975 amendment designated the Collateral References. 
former section as subsec. (1 ) ; added sub- Ba&tards<3=>80 et seq. 
sec. (2 ) ; and made minor changes in 10 C.J.S. Bastards §§ 116, 117. 
phraseology in subsec. (1). io Am. Jur. 2d 935 et seq., Bastards 
§ 126 et seq. 
78-45a-6. Time of trial.—Tf the issue of paternity is raised in action 
commenced during the pregnancy of the mother, the trial shall not, without 
the consent of the alleged father, be held until after the birth or mis-
carriage but during such delay testimony may be perpetrated according to 
the laws of this state. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 6. 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 101. 
10 Am. Jur. 2d 932, Bastards 8 123. 
Collateral References. 
BastardsC=>67. 
78-45a-7. Authority for blood tests.—The court, upon its own initiative 
or upon suggestion made by or on behalf of any person whose blood is in-
520 
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 78-45a-10 
volved may, or upon motion of any party to the action made at a time so 
as not to delay the proceedings unduly, shall order the mother, child and 
alleged father to submit to blood tests. If any party refuses to submit to 
such tests, tlie court may resolve tlie question of paternity against such 
party or enforce its order if the rights of others and the interests of justice 
so require. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 7. 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 93. 
10 Am. Jur . 2d 928, Bastards § 118. 
Cross-Reference. 
mood tests to determine parentage, 78- Weight and sufficiency of blood grouping 
25-18 to 78-25-23. f(.st to show paternity or legitimacy, 46 A. 
L. 11. 2d 1027. 
Collateral References. 
Bustards-C^GS. 
78-45a-8. Selection of experts.—The tests shall be made by experts 
qualified as examiners of blood types who shall be appointed by the court. 
The experts shall be called by the court as witnesses to testify to their 
findings and shall be subject to cross-examination by the parties. Any party 
or person at whose suggestion the tests have been ordered may demand that 
other experts, qualified as examiners of blood types, perform independent 
tests under order of court, the results of which may be offered in evidence. 
The number and qualifications of such experts shall be determined by the 
court. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 8. Cross-Reference. 
Blood test examiner as witness, 78-25-20. 
78-45a-9. Compensation of expert witnesses.—The compensation of each 
expert witness appointed by the court shall be fixed at a reasonable amount. 
It shall be paid as the court shall order. The court may order that it be 
paid by the parties in such proportions and at such times as it shall pre-
scribe. The fee of an expert witness called by a party but not appointed 
by the court shall be paid by the party calling him but shall not be taxed 
as costs in the action. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 9. Collateral References. 
Bastards<3=>94. 
10 C.J.S. Bastards § 138. 
78-45a-10. Effect of test results.—If the court finds that the conclusions 
of all experts, as disclosed by the evidence based upon the tests, are that 
the alleged father is not the father of the child, the question of paternity 
shall be resolved accordingly, [f the experts disagree in their findings or 
conclusions, the question shall be submitted upon all the evidence. If the 
experts conclude that the blood tests show the possibility of the alleged 
father's paternity, admission of this evidence is within the discretion of the 
court, depending upon the infrequency of the blood type. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 10. Cross-Reference. 
Admissibility of blood test results, 78-
2.J-21. 
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